By Chris Miller

No matter how capable intelligence collectors are, no matter how insightful analysts are, no matter how skilled briefers are, and no matter how useful their products are, if intelligence is not received, misunderstood, or discarded by policymakers, it will be for naught. Understanding the relationship between the intelligence community and policymakers is necessary to understand the “friction” between them and how it affects intelligence estimates and U.S. national security.

As Joshua Rovner explores in his book, Fixing the Facts, correctly identifying security threats in time to respond to them is difficult enough on its own. After analysts have overcome barriers to identify threats, they still have to overcome competition to communicate with and convince policymakers that the threat is real. Analysts want access to policymakers and want their analyses to be considered. Once they have access, they must still overcome policymakers’ belief in their own analysis abilities and natural human skepticism.

Burden of Indecision

Intelligence analysts differ from policymakers in their approach to security issues and this is reflected in their assessments. U.S. policymakers are generally either elected politicians or appointees answerable to the elected official who appointed them. They may also be senior military commanders. These policymakers come into position with firm policy beliefs which—they believe—expose unchanging, universal truths in international relations.

Many elected officials adhere to a political party platform that often predetermines their choices on security issues. Some carry “policy baggage” from having previously publicly supported or taken certain security decisions in the past. Policymakers as “deciders” do not have the luxury of remaining uncommitted and have less trouble making firm estimates or policy stances. They are and must be confident in their views and are oriented toward action. As Robert Jervis points out, they carry the “burden of decision” regarding policy, unlike intelligence analysts who must only “figure out what the world is like.”

Analysts approach security issues from an academic standpoint with the goal of generating objective analysis free from ideology, values judgments or world view. They are less confident speaking in absolutes. Nonetheless, as Gregory Treverton explains, analysts on their own, can focus on wider questions of interest, but not necessarily relevant to the “specific, time sensitive, and operational” questions of policymakers.

This academic approach was instilled in the Intelligence Community in the beginning—especially at CIA—by Sherman Kent, the original architect of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Analysts are rarely comfortable making unequivocal predictions, preferring instead to speak in terms of probability. Without a fixed world view or assumptions, change and uncertainty are normal for analysts. Mark Lowenthal has depicted this issue as a difference in “tribal tongues” between analysts and policymakers. Analysts seek objective “truth” and probability in ambiguous situations; policymakers seek certainty to make policy decisions. Analysts become invested in their estimates and policymakers become invested in policy, but not necessarily vice versa.

No matter how capable intelligence collectors are, no matter how insightful analysts are, no matter how skilled briefers are, and no matter how useful their products are, if intelligence is not received, misunderstood, or discarded by policymakers, it will be for naught.

No matter how much Intelligence seeks to remain objective, however, it exists to serve policymakers. This makes it an unequal relationship. The intelligence community needs policymakers and would not exist without them; policymakers do not need the Intelligence Community. As Rovner points out, the difference in approach and this unequal relationship has caused “friction” in the intelligence-policymaker relationship from the beginning of the intelligence community. Jervis believes, “The different needs and perspectives of decision makers and intelligence officials guarantee conflict between them.”

As Rovner puts it, in their focus on objectivity, many analysts view policy-specific requirements from policymakers suspiciously and feel they are being subjectively led by the nose to reach certain conclusions. It is easy for them to see criticisms of their conclusions by managers or policymakers as politically motivated. Analysts believe in the superiority of their all-source product, encompassing both open and secret information. Above all, they believe the processing and analysis of intelligence should be done by professionals applying established analytical procedures. It is necessary for them to believe this and convince policymakers of it. The superiority of Intelligence Community products and the “edge” they supposedly give policymakers is the justification for the massive budget the U.S. government allocates to intelligence annually.

Competing Views and Interests

Analysts become invested in controlling their product for two reasons. First, it is a tenet of the intelligence profession not to disclose sources and methods because of the harm such can do to assets and collection. The wider intelligence products are disseminated, the greater the chance they will be compromised. Analysts know to what length and expense collection efforts go to produce intelligence and therefore what their loss means in terms of effort and cost.

Second, controlling access to secret information is an exercise in leverage by the intelligence community. Because Intelligence is beholden to policymakers for existence, oversight and finance, controlling access to the information it holds and the “aura” of secret intelligence provides leverage against policymakers, lends credibility to Intelligence and creates demand for its products. Intelligence has incentives to play up the superiority of its information and control access to it.

Policymakers see things differently. Today, the intelligence community is not the only place to obtain information and, according to Harry Howe Ransom, it is historically no better at predicting international events before they unfold than other organizations. Policymakers also “cherry-pick” assessments support their views from a range of agencies within the intelligence community.

Intelligence often cannot deliver estimates of quickly-developing situations much faster than 24-hour news outlets. Intelligence argues this is because its products are more deliberately vetted and analyzed and are more dependable than the profit-driven media. Intelligence must also move more deliberately because of the need to protect assets, sometimes delaying reporting.

Policymakers believe that intelligence, with its endless resources, should have the answer to all requirements. Indeed, the USIC plays up its ability to do so. When it cannot always deliver, its worth is diminished in their eyes. Amy Zegart points out that policymakers, often with little to no intelligence experience, come to see intelligence as a “free good”, not fully understanding the time, risk and difficulty that goes into intelligence products. They simply ask a question and the Intelligence gives an answer. Mark Lowenthal found that policymakers are often impressed with Intelligence Community capabilities early in their career, but this diminishes as their expectations of what intelligence should deliver increases.

‘Kent School’ or ‘Gates School’?

The traditional objective Intelligence approach often conflicts with its position of dependence on policymakers. If objective intelligence products are produced that are irrelevant to policymakers’ requirements, intelligence will stand to lose influence and access to policymakers. At times, analysts can seem to focus on answering questions no policymaker was asking. Therefore, it is argued, Intelligence must engage policymakers’ concerns to be relevant.

To address this issue, in the 1980s then-DCI Robert Gates pushed the Intelligence Community to produce estimates of greater utility to policymakers. Gates replaced Sherman Kent’s Office of National Estimates (ONE)-a board of detached, distant ‘wise men’ with a final-product process akin to defending a doctoral thesis-with a system of individual National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), a collection of senior officials from the Intelligence Community, military or academia. Their job is to engage with policymakers and gauge and gear estimates toward their policy requirements.

Many objected to this change as inviting politics into analysis and called it the end of Kent’s model of detached objectivity. Uri Bar-Joseph argues that this shift from the “Kent School” to the “Gates School” has left American Intelligence more susceptible to politicization than its international counterparts.

Others have depicted the dilemma as a choice between potential politicization and irrelevance to policymakers or between incorruptibility and losing influence. Neglected intelligence estimates are as dangerous as wrong estimates. In any case, the “Gates School” continues to characterize the intelligence-policymaker relationship.

An Unequal Relationship

Intelligence and policymakers have an unequal relationship. Policymakers often lean heavily upon the judgment of the intelligence community because of their own lack of experience or insight. But they do not have to rely solely upon them and there are alternative information sources available. Policymakers also become convinced of the superiority of their own judgment and grow wary of intelligence capabilities. The intelligence community is convinced of the superiority of its all-source product and attempts to maintain access to policymakers by convincing them using the “aura” of secret intelligence.

Intelligence, however, is ultimately beholden to policymakers, who do not necessarily share analysts’ view of the superiority of their product, do not have to rely solely on their information, and do not necessarily understand the resources that go into the production of intelligence estimates. In an effort to maintain influence with policymakers, intelligence has come to focus on producing estimates relevant to policymakers’ objectives, a move some have claimed is necessary, while others claim it comes at the cost of objectivity and invites politicization into the estimative process.

These differences and conflicts in approach to security issues create “friction” between intelligence and policymakers. It has always been an unequal relationship but never has it been this uneasy.

[Photo: Flickr CC: Chuck Hagel]

Chris Miller is a U.S. Army veteran and Purple Heart recipient following two tours in Baghdad, Iraq and has worked as a military contractor in the Middle East. His work currently focuses on strategic studies. His interests are CBRN, military and veterans issues, the Cold War, and international security affairs.